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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1751 
___________ 
 
FENG YING LI, 
                Petitioner 
    
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A77 234 282) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Paul Grussendorf 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 5, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Feng Ying Li petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (ABIA@), which, following remand by this Court, again denied her second and 
third motions to reopen her immigration proceedings.  We will deny the petition for 
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review.   
  Li is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who entered the United 
States in 1998.  She was ordered removed in 2002, when the BIA affirmed the denial of 
her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Li’s first motion to reopen, filed in 2005, was 
based on the birth of her second child.  The BIA denied the motion and we denied her 
petition for review.  See Li v. Att=y Gen., 321 F. App’x 143 (3d Cir. 2009).   
  In the meantime, Li filed her second and third motions to reopen, alleging 
changed conditions in China with respect to the government’s enforcement of its 
population control policies.  She supported those motions with numerous documents, 
including academic and news articles, Chinese government policy materials, State 
Department reports, and Congressional testimony.  The Board denied both motions, and 
Li filed a timely petition for review.  Because “[t]he Board provided only general 
explanations for its conclusion that the evidence Li submitted was insufficient to support 
reopening,” we granted the petition for review and directed the BIA to “provide a more 
thorough analysis of the evidence submitted.”1  Li v. Att’y Gen., 373 F. App’x 280, 282, 
284 (3d Cir. 2010).     
                                              
1
 We did conclude, however, that purported translation errors in the Department of 
State’s 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions in China (“2007 
Profile”), even if proven, were minor and would not change the outcome of Li’s case if 
the proceedings were reopened.  Therefore, we denied the petition for review as it related 
to the alleged translation errors. 
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  On remand, the Board notified the parties that the case had been placed on 
the docket for adjudication.  Although the Board did not invite evidentiary submissions or 
briefing, Li provided numerous additional documents, totaling several hundred pages.  
The Board declined to consider these documents, noting that the “submissions facially 
have numerous evidentiary issues, and [that Li] . . . has failed to provide any basic 
explanation as to their relevance.”   With respect to the evidence that Li had submitted 
with her second and third motions to reopen, the Board again held that Li had failed to 
establish a change in country conditions so as to create an exception to the time limitation 
on filing motions to reopen.  For example, the BIA concluded that several of the 
documents did not support reopening because they were either incomplete, partially 
illegible, duplicative of material considered by the Board in published decisions, lacked 
certificates of translation, or otherwise undermined Li’s changed country conditions 
claim.  The Board also concluded that a letter from Li’s parents was “facially suspect” 
because it contained inconsistencies concerning the age of Li’s children.  Similarly, the 
Board determined that a village committee notice addressed to Li was of “limited 
evidentiary value” because Li failed to explain, inter alia, why it was issued 10 years after 
she departed China.  Consequently, the BIA denied the motions to reopen.  Li filed a 
timely petition for review.     
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to INA § 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252].  We review 
the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 
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241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under this standard, we may reverse the BIA’s decision only if 
it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the 
motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final 
administrative decision was rendered.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  The time and number 
requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country 
conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed 
circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and 
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). 
  In her brief, Li focuses on the Board’s alleged failure to address evidence 
that she submitted to the BIA following our remand (the “post-remand evidence”).2  
Importantly, however, the BIA did not fail to address this evidence.  Instead, the Board 
specifically considered the evidence, noted numerous procedural and substantive 
problems with it, and ultimately “declined to consider the [evidence] any further.”  We 
conclude that this was not an abuse of discretion.   
  Notably, our remand order did not require that the Board permit the parties 
to submit additional evidence, and the Board did not request such submissions following 
                                              
2
 This evidence included news articles, internal government documents from Li’s 
hometown, and a report authored by Dr. Flora Sapio, which challenged the validity of the 
Department of State’s 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions in China 
(A2007 Profile@).”   
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our remand.  In addition, Li did not move to supplement her pending motions to reopen, 
she did not file a new motion to reopen, and, significantly, she did not provide any 
argument or explanation to the BIA concerning the relevance of the post-remand 
evidence.
3
  Cf. BIA Practice Manual Ch. 3.3(e)(iii) (2004) (directing that “[w]hen a party 
submits voluminous secondary source material, that party should highlight or otherwise 
indicate the pertinent passages of that secondary source material.”).  Rather, without 
permission from the Board, Li simply submitted over 700 pages of indexed material, 
under cover pages generically entitled “Submission in Support of Remand.”  As the 
Board observed, many of these documents suffered from evidentiary issues:  some 
appeared to have been prepared for presentation in another case; some were poorly 
copied or illegible; and some were supported by photocopies of a single, generic 
certificate of translation that failed to identify the documents to which it pertained, failed 
to include the date of translation, and failed to include an original signature of the 
translator.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (describing requirements for translation of 
documents).  Furthermore, many of the documents pertained to enforcement of family 
planning policies in places other than Li’s hometown.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the post-
                                              
3
 In this connection, we lack jurisdiction to consider Li’s arguments that the post-remand 
evidence warrants reopening.  INA § 242(d)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)]; Lin v. Att’y 
Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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remand evidence.
4
  See Garcia v. Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
BIA has discretion whether to consider a supplemental brief and exhibit submitted in 
support of a motion to reopen). 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                              
4
 To the extent that Li faults the BIA for failing to adequately consider evidence 
submitted with her motions to reopen, we likewise conclude that the BIA did not abuse 
its discretion.  The Board corrected the deficiencies we identified in its previous order, 
discussed the evidence in detail, and reasonably concluded that it did not demonstrate a 
change in country conditions in China regarding enforcement of its family planning 
policies.  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2009). 
